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Liquid thoughts

October 25, 2010
By Thorismund in Metaphysics, Philosophy of mind

Consider the following theses:

1) Both the contents and the vehicles of contents of perception are out of our heads

2) The content of perception is conceptual in a minimal sense

3) The content of a thought can be identical to the content of a perception

Recall the last time you’ve stared at the sea from the vicinity of a beach. If you’ve never had this particular visual experience, allow me to use the picture below to aid your imagination:

It follows, from the conjunction of theses 1), 2) and 3) that it could be the case that while you’re contemplating that scene, your thought is made of water. Literally.

The intentional content of your thought and and your thought itself could very well be the same thing. In sum, your thought would be constituted solely by its referent.

Does this look really absurd? Consider opposing views such as that your thoughts are constituted by arrangements of nervous cells (as in neurocentric varieties of Type-Materialism) or that they are extramental and abstract Fregean sensa. If you’re looking for immediate intellectual fulfillment on the ontology of thoughts – and mental states in general – you won’t find it anywhere. Our pretheoretical intuitions are a terrible guide here.

Theses 1-3 were taken from the published repertoire of Alva Noë, particularly from his brilliant book Action in Perception. Precursors from similar views however are found in early analytic philosophy.  In his posthumously published monograph Theory of Knowledge, section On The Nature Of Acquaintance, Bertrand Russell wrote “if anything is immediately present to me, that thing must be part of my mind“.

Proponents of mental content internalism have struggled for decades proposing solutions to the problem of how the referents of thoughts could be fixed. An ordinary, albeit fallacious, accusation done by detractors is that there is nothing in the states of nervous systems that really look like the intentional content of mental states. But representations do not need to look like the events or conditions they represent (even though there were many attempts of locating empirically the structural isomorphs of intentional contents, sometimes with strikingly similar results).

But if you are to give some importance to this intuitive ‘similarity constraint’… the conjunction of active externalism with perception enactivism provides a simple, elegant answer for how the referents of some thoughts about water are fixed. On at least a certain class of water-toughts, your thought is about water and it is structurally isomorphic with water because… it is identical to the very water you’re experiencing. Thoughts with purely intentional content would be self-referential.

Given these considerations, it would seem natural to claim that the same wouldn’t follow from different sorts of water-thoughts, those that would be employing cognitive/descriptive content from the concept ‘water’ – what is usually called the narrow content of the concept ‘water’, supervenient to the organism’s internal cognitive states. I believe that with the enactivist framework of Noë and his reflections of perception being intrinsically skillful, we could provide externalist answers to cases involving what could be considered paradigmatic narrow mental content.

When you see the sea (pun intended), you’re not just perceiving such-and-such mass of fluid in certain spatial orientation from your point of view. You’re also perceiving the possibilities of engaging organismically with the ocean. Had you been armed with the relevant prior sensorimotor knowledge, it will present to you a suite of affordances, prospects for action. If you’d jump in the sea, you’d get wet and have your body immersed, depending on your tissue composition and depth of of the water. If you’d attempt to grab the water with your bare hands, the liquid would escape through your fingers. If you were to move inside it, it would demand more bodily effort.

The information for (some?) of the wetness, viscosity and density used in our descriptions of ‘water’ is supplied externally in this view. The environment itself is providing you with the different ways of presentation of ‘water’, presumably with no need to access your long-term memory. The contribution from the agent is the sensorimotor know-how to accurately engage with the environment and extract this information from it.

Or is it? This picture of organism/environmental coupling looks analogous to pieces from a jigsaw puzzle. If a piece from a jigsaw board is missing, one can infer precisely what’s the pattern of the missing piece by paying attention to the shapes of the adjacent ones. And if they are providing information, even indirectly, they are contentful. Perhaps this analogy mis-matches with the case of perception due to the the fact that the later is highly context-dependent and slight changes in the position and focus of attention of the agent could completely alter the available specifications while there’s only one configuration for a jigsaw puzzle.

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By Thorismund in Epistemology, Philosophy of science, Pseudoscience

These have been peculiar times for the Intelligence Design community.

Two weeks ago, the teenage son of Michael Behe, biochemist of Darwin’s Black Box fame and main spearhead of the ID movement, outed himself as an atheist. Even more dramatically, the trigger of his de-conversion was the bestselling anti-theistic book of one of his father’s nemesis, Richard Dawkins.

Now, William Dembski is being exposed as a potential closet Young-Earth Creationist.

Over at Panda’s Thumb, there’s an analysis of statements by Dembski that were paraphrased in a response to a negative review of his latest book on theodicy. The conclusion is sound; Dembski considers that Gen 1-11 consists of true historical narratives. Up to this point, biblical inerrantism and a literal interpretation of the Book of Genesis themselves are positions that Old-Earth Creationists also claim to defend, although I concur with the fundamentalists in that they are the correct ones exegetically. For biblical literalists, Moses’ speech acts in the early chapters of Genesis are standard assertions, descriptions of events, no significant allegorical content is implied or intended. OECs happen to fudge implausible meanings and stretch the polysemy of hebrew vocabulary in order to accomodate a standard cosmological timeline and avoid a fantasy worldwide catastrophism. Dembski happens to be very clear in not compromising his biblical literalism with a local interpretation of the Noachian Deluge:

In any case, not only Genesis 6-9 but also Jesus in Matthew 24 and Peter in Second Peter seem clearly to teach that the Flood was universal. As a biblical inerrantist, I believe that what the Bible teaches is true and bow to the text, including its teaching about the Flood and its universality.

The package of absurdities that biblical literalists consider to be factual goes well beyond a couple of naked primates born without parents and floating prehistorical zoos managed by eight people during the course of a year. There’s also the talking serpent, the talking donkey, the giant-king Og, genocider angels, hordes of zombies and many other fictitious creatures ontologically on par with what you usually find in a Dungeons&Dragons book. Bill Dembski by default believes in all this baloney, and we have other examples of his vice of gullibility.

As a Westerner, I feel deeply ashamed that a man as highly educated and intelligent as William Dembski accepts Iron Age semitic mythology as fact in place of the precious accrued collective knowledge and thinking tools developed by his culture. His academic work is a parody of science.

Concerning this case, biologist PZ Myers described Dembski as an “honest lunatic”. I wouldn’t be so sure about his honesty. Honesty is a virtuous character trait supposed to be globally stable, causally efficient over the behavior of the agent and temporally enduring.

Dembski has consistently exposed for nearly two decades an acceptance of mainstream cosmology, astrophysics and geology on affairs of the natural timeline of the Universe and tried to distance himself in practice from “scientific creationists” (oxymoron).

Either he is a liar, in which case he is dishonest, or he engaged in a major belief revision over a short period of time, in which case he is at best intellectually imprudent. We’re talking about an enormously extensive worldview change, an elaborate distortion of how one sees the past. From a local flood of considerable size to a global flood, the change in surface area is greater by a factor of over one thousand.

One way to understand this dramatic transformation of his belief systems would be the case in which he accepted a foundationalist theory of justification based on the personal revelation of the Holy Spirit as more epistemically authoritative than an evidentialist theory of justification. If the Book of Nature and the Book of God mismatch, by default the scientists are wrong. All empirical inquiry is therefore biased to the pre-determined content of presuppositional apologetics. Creationist ministries such as ICR and AiG are very explicit on this.

Here’s the catch; if Dembski is a sincere presuppositionalist biblical inerrantist, he’s no longer in the game of asking for evidence of how bacterial flagella could evolve neodarwinially from a Type-III secretion system since a priori, anything that could be offered to justify these claims would be false. His demands would never be satisfied in principle and he would be only fooling around asking for evidence. He’d be out of the arena of scientific discourse and practice.

If he isn’t fooling around, he’s either incoherent and compartmentalizes the principles he chooses to justify his knowledge or he’s not really the presuppositionalist biblical literalist he believes to be. By the same token, anytime he makes a claim such as that the major animal phyla appeared suddenly with fully functional front-loaded bauplans in the Cambrian Explosion, he’s engaging in the language game of “make believe” since if he’s indeed a YEC, he doesn’t regard the Cambrian Explosion as an actual historical event.

Resorting to the tactic of keeping a foundationalist epistemology based on personal revelation to matters of faith and evidentialism to matters of empirical fact results in automatic failure since Christianity is filled with empirical claims originating in the scriptures, traditions and practices. The Book of God is superposed with the Book of Nature. I state that methodological naturalism is false and at best, useless, and Dembski couldn’t agree more with that, as stamped on his book Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science & Theology.

Really stupid beliefs that threaten the dignity of our hard-earned intellectual achievements deserve our mockery.

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By Thorismund in Metaphysics, Philosophy of mind

The gadget engineer and entrepreneur-turned-theoretical neuroscientist Jeff Hawkins, author of On Intelligence, has a very interesting three-year old presentation which remains as one of my personal favorites out of TED Talks:

Jeff’s talk is filled with brain fodder (pun intended) such as his cognitivist criticisms of naïve behavioristic definitions of intelligence and his lucid appraisal of the current state of neuroscience as still dwelving in a Kuhnian phase of puzzle-solving, awaiting for a conceptual revolution. Defining intelligence in terms of the predictive capacity of an agent is as good as it gets for a prima facie definition of intelligence, as Dan Dennett once put it.

To me, one of the most striking features of this talk is a slide containing a diagram (in archetypical functionalist boxology) of what Mr. Hawkins sees as the main wrong-headed assumption behind Strong AI research programs:

Behavior As Product

That diagram couldn’t have been a more effective and explicit instance of what the epistemologist-turned-philosopher of mind Fred Dretske claimed to be a category mistake rampantly perpetrated by functionalists. It was one of the main themes of the first chapters of his intriguing and ambitious little book Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes, published 22 years ago.

Dretske presents an ingenious metaphysical distinction between products (outputs) and processes, which are terms often used interchangeably even in the technical literature of artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind.

Processes aren’t just concatenations of states or events; a process is a temporally extended entity through which a certain outcome is terminated – meaning that a particular process ended. This output requires the through and through realization of each of the parts of the process, often in the right order. Imagine an automobile factory; if during the construction of a car you skip the painting stage, your product will be unfinished. And it wouldn’t make any sense at all to initiate the painting stage when one does not have any vehicle to paint. Processes can be constituted by other processes.

If a given product has not been deployed or realized, the process hasn’t finished. Processes do not cause products; processes are the production of products. And processes are partly constituted by their ending products.

Take for instance the process of delousing. The terminal condition of this process is the removal of some rather unpleasant hematophagous insects. However, strictly speaking, delousing does not cause dead lice. The bodily remains of the lice are precisely the product, which in turn are part of the process – the very last part of it.

For Dretske, behavior itself – which should be understood broadly, from breathing to thinking – is always a process token. Behaviors are processes endogenously caused in an organism or artifact which produce movements (again, this should also be understood broadly, not merely as visible movements but encompassing internal activities). And this is the functionalist category mistake – behavior is not the output of a system due to mereological considerations.

This applies even to Hawkins’ model and alternative framing of the issue; the most important outputs of the neocortex are predictions and expectations and these are themselves products of some sort of behavior, broadly considered. However, we can be charitable and interpret ‘behavior’ in his sense as external effects like speech acts and bodily motions.

And why should we care about this particular process/product distinction? Couldn’t this be just another useless and arid theoretical dispute? I’ll concede just one answer for now; I believe one is warranted to accept such a distinction in order to secure some autonomy of psychology from the biological sciences and the validity of psychological explanations at the personal level. Which is precisely the main philosophical project of Dretske in the rest of his book. I shall in the future discuss more of Dretske’s definition of processes, for instance its dependability on certain grammatical constraints.

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